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Abstract. 
Evaluating the effect of institutional features by exploiting cross-country variability with cross-
sectional data is difficult. Difference-in-difference strategies are sometimes employed to reach 
identification. In this paper, we discuss the difference-in-difference strategies adopted in the literature 
to evaluate the effect of early tracking on learning inequalities using surveys administered to children 
of different grades. In their seminal paper: “Does educational tracking affect performance and 
inequality? Differences-in-differences evidence across countries” Economic Journal (2006), 
Hanushek, and Woessmann analyze the effect of early tracking on inequalities with two-step analysis. 
Other scholars, instead, focus on the social background regression coefficient, using individual-level 
models applied to pooled data from all countries. We demonstrate that since test scores are measured 
on different scales at different surveys, pooled data strategies may yield to completely uninformative 
results. Against this background, we use data on reading literacy in PIRLS 2006 and PISA 2012 and 
carry out two-step difference-in-difference analyses on the effect of early tracking on social 
background learning inequalities.   
Keywords. Achievement inequalities, international assessments, early tracking, cross-sectional 
data, non-equated scores, difference-in-difference, pooled models, two-step estimation. 
JEL classification: I24, C10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The persistency of educational inequalities among different socioeconomic and demographic groups 
is an issue of major concern among social scientists. Along large differentials in educational 
attainment, the development of standardized learning assessments has highlighted the existence of 
substantial achievement inequalities among children of the same age or school grade in many 
countries. Since learning processes are cumulative (Cunha et al. 2006), the way inequalities evolve 
throughout childhood in different contexts is also of great interest. The ideal dataset to analyze the 
dynamics of learning inequalities is longitudinal, with achievement measured on the same scale at 
different age/grades (i.e. vertically equated scores). This would allow evaluating achievement growth 
for each child and relating this growth to individual, family and context factors, and to prior 
achievement. However, longitudinal data and equated scores are often unavailable. To describe the 
development of inequalities with cross-sectional data it is common practice to compare differentials 
between socio-demographic groups over assessments held at different school years; if test scores are 
non-equated, they are used in standardized form. 
Parallel to national studies, the development of international surveys like PISA, TIMSS and PIRLS 
has revealed remarkable cross-country variability in children’s competencies and in the extent to 
which ascribed individual characteristics affect learning (OECD, 2010a: OECD 2010b; Mullis et al. 
2012; Mullis et al. 2012). Moreover, by exploiting the institutional variability existing at the cross-
national level, these assessments also allow to analyze the role played by characteristics of 
educational systems (e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann, 2006; Ammermueller, 2007; Fuchs and 
Woessmann, 2007; Schuetz et al., 2008). Since international surveys are cross-sectional, most of the 
existing literature focuses on achievement at a given age or school year. 
Early tracking is indubitably the institution that has raised the greatest debate.1 Arguments in favor 
of early tracking relate to the potential advantages of instruction with homogeneous groups of 
children. Opponents of early tracking argue that it fosters educational inequalities. Firstly, children 
of higher socioeconomic backgrounds, by receiving more familial support, tend to be more motivated 
and to perform better even at young age. Thus, early tracking exposes young children to homogeneous 
learning environments in terms of both ability and socioeconomic fabric. If peer effects operate, this 
segregation could go to the detriment of the children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Secondly, 
children of disadvantaged backgrounds are less likely to choose the academic track (and thus to be 
exposed to more ambitious learning content) even at similar levels of prior performance (Jackson, 
2013). A strong influence of families on their offspring’s educational choices – likely to enhance 
                                                          
1
 We refer to tracking policies where children following different educational programs are placed in different schools (as 
opposed to within-school ability streaming).  
social origin inequalities, because costs and benefits may be evaluated differently across backgrounds 
and because of information asymmetries – is more likely to occur when tracking occurs at an early 
age, and with weaker ability restrictions (Checchi  and Flabbi, 2007). 
A number of studies analyze the effect of tracking on achievement inequality using single 
international assessment and estimate individual-level models on pooled data from all countries. By 
including an interaction term between family background and the system-level variable indexing 
tracking, they compare the family background coefficients between tracked and comprehensive 
systems. However, evaluating the impact of institutional features by exploiting cross-country 
variability is problematic with cross-sectional data, because it is difficult to control for unobserved 
system-level factors potentially affecting inequalities at all schooling stages. For this reason, some 
scholars propose to exploit two cross-sectional surveys held at different age or grades, and use 
difference-in-difference strategies. In their seminal work, Hanushek and Woessmann (2007) apply 
difference-in-difference to scores’ dispersion, while Waldinger (2007), Jakuboski (2010), Van de 
Werfhost (2013), Ammermueller (2013) and Ruhose, Schwerdt (2015) apply difference-in-difference 
to family-background regression coefficients. Hanushek and Woessmann (2007) apply a two-step 
method: in the first step, they run separate models on individual data for each country; in the second 
step, they relate the estimates of the social background coefficient to country-level characteristics. 
The other scholars mentioned above, instead, pool together the data from all countries and 
assessments, and estimate individual-level models with individual-level and system-level explanatory 
variables. Notably, these scholars do not reach the same conclusions: most of them find that early 
tracking has a detrimental effect on equity, whereas Waldinger (2007) finds no negative effects.    
In this contribution, we compare these estimation strategies – two-step and pooled individual 
models – in terms of their capacity to deliver meaningful findings. We go beyond the general 
limitations of cross-country studies in inferring “causal” effects of system-level features, and examine 
the specific restrictions imposed by the models adopted in the literature. We show that pooled 
individual models rely on unnecessary and often untenable constraints, and thus may yield to 
meaningless results. Restrictions are particularly severe because the test scores released by 
international assessments are measured on different scales. Two-step estimation, instead, always 
yields to interpretable findings.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we specify a simple achievement growth model, 
describe the mechanisms at play, relate them to the model’s structural parameters, and discuss what 
information different types of data (longitudinal vs. cross-sectional) and measurement scales (equated 
vs. non-equated scores) deliver on these mechanisms. In Section 3 we describe the difference-in-
difference strategies employed in the literature to evaluate the effects of institutional features on 
achievement inequalities between children of different family backgrounds, and highlight the 
underlying assumptions and the conditions for consistent estimation of “causal” effects, ignoring 
scaling issues. We conclude our line of reasoning in Section 4, where we analyze the additional 
problems of these difference-in-difference strategies, arising when the dependent variable is 
measured on different scales over time, as occurs for international learning assessments.  
Finally, by employing the data on reading literacy in PIRLS 2006 and PISA 2012, we carry out 
two-step difference-in-difference empirical analyses of the effect of tracking on learning inequalities. 
We replicate the analysis in Hanushek and Woessmann (2007) on overall inequality (as measured by 
the country standard deviation) with more recent data, and perform new analyses on social 
background inequalities (identified by the social background regression coefficient). Altogether, our 
results, summarized in Section 5, provide evidence that early tracking contributes to increasing both 
overall inequalities and the differentials among children of different social origin.   
2. A simple achievement growth model. 
Our starting point is a stylized model of achievement growth. In this section we present this model, 
and discuss the identification of the structural parameters with different types of data and different 
score measurements. We show that with cross-sectional data and achievement measured on different 
scales as children age – as occurs for international learning assessments – the relevant parameters are 
generally unidentified. More specifically, we show that the comparison of regression coefficients 
does not convey much information on the development of inequalities. This is a relevant point 
because, as we will see in section 3, what difference-in-difference strategies with pooled individual 
models do in essence, is comparing the difference between social background regression coefficients 
at different surveys across tracking regimes.      
Consider a stylized model of learning development according to which abilities cumulate over 
time, so that achievement at time t equals achievement at time t-1 plus a growth component. This can 
be viewed as an ideal model of cognitive ability, assuming it can be measured on a meaningful interval 
scale and that it evolves linearly. Initial ability and growth may also be affected by individual ascribed 
characteristics such as gender and family background (e.g. socioeconomic status, minority, ethnic or 
immigrant origin). Children from advantaged backgrounds tend to perform better because they live 
in more stimulating environments and receive more parental support, and/or because, due to 
information asymmetries, they are more capable to acquire relevant information on the schooling 
system and choose better schools.  
Assume we have two cross sectional surveys assessing students’ learning at different stages of the 
educational career, t=1 and t=2. In order to keep the formalization as simple as possible, we posit no 
measurement error, so that test scores are perfect measures of cognitive ability. Assume that 
achievement at different ages is measured on the same scale (i.e. test scores are “vertically equated”)2. 
Let  be the score at t=2 and  the score at t=1. To simplify the exposition, we refer to a single 
explanatory variable x (social background, in our current example) and assume that:  
 =  + 	
 +                                                               (1) 
Scores at t=1 and t=2 are related by: 
 =  +                                                                                                                                    (2) 
where  is achievement growth. Growth is assumed to depend linearly on explanatory variables and 
may also depend on previous achievement: 
 = ∆ + 
 +  +                                                                                                              (3) 
 measures whether children of high backgrounds improve or worsen their performance between t=1 
and t=2, relative to equally performing children of low backgrounds at t=1. We will refer to it as 
“new” x-effects. This is the most interesting mechanism because it involves social background 
directly. Instead, 1 + 	 are carry-over effects of pre-existing inequalities (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The two mechanisms underlying the development of x-inequalities 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
1  1  
 
2
 
2
 
′1 ′1  
 
′2
 
′2
 
Scores in 
t=2 metrics 
 
 
 
 
growth 
Scores in 
t=2 metrics 1  1  
 
1  1  
2  
 
2  
 
growth 
	1 +  
 
“NEW” 
EFFECT 
CARRY-OVER 
EFFECT 
	 
 
L =low social origin H =high social origin 
  
                                                          
2
 To create a vertical scale, scores from two tests at different age or grades are linked statistically through a process known 
as calibration, so that scores can be expressed on a common scale (Patz 2007). Practical and conceptual issues involved 
in vertical scaling (e.g. Bond and Lang 2012) are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Ideally, we would like to estimate the average growth differential (|
 + 1 − (|
 =  + 	 
and disentangle new x-effects and carryover effects, as they reflect substantially different 
mechanisms. Can we accomplish this with different types of data? 
With longitudinal data and scores measured on a single scale as children grow older, the structural 
parameters are obviously identified. Assume now that achievement is measured on different scales. 
In this circumstance,  represents the (unknown) score at t=1 in the measurement scale employed at 
t=2. Assume a linear relation between scales, so that  = + + ,, where  is the corresponding 
observed score. Note that + and , are not known and unidentifiable. The estimable model for  is 
then: 
 = -./012 = 3/012 + 42 
 + 5./2                                                                                                    (4) 
while according to (1)-(3), the model for  becomes: 
 =  +  = + + , + ∆ + 
 + + + , +  
      = +1 +  + ∆ + ,1 +  + 
 +                                         (5) 
By relating observed scores at two occasions, (5) has the structure of a panel data model with a lagged 
term. Note that ,1 +  does not describe the dynamics of the learning process, as it depends on the 
unknown rescaling factor , that allows to translate scores in the scale at t=1 into scores in the scale 
at t=2. Now, by conditioning on previous achievement, we can consistently estimate . Instead,  is 
unidentified: this means that we cannot measure absolute growth, nor test whether achievement of 
well performing children grows more or less than that of lower performing ones. 
What can we infer on the development of inequalities with cross-sectional data? With simple 
substitutions, we obtain the cross-sectional model: 
 =  +  + 1 + 	
 + 1 +  +                                                                      (6) 
The regression coefficient  + 1 + 	 represents the overall social background differential 
developed up to t=2 and is an estimable quantity with cross-sectional data.  
Absolute scores 
We may be tempted to evaluate whether in a given country social background inequalities have 
widened between two assessments, by comparing the average “growth” on observed scores: 
(6|
 + 17 − (6|
 + 17 − (6|
7 − (6|
7 
This amounts to evaluating the difference of regression coefficients at the two assessments shown in 
(4) and (6). This difference is given by  + 1 + 	 − 42 =  + 	 + , − 1 42.  The term  + 	 
is the overall true achievement growth differential: (|
 + 1 − (|
, whereas , − 1 42 has no 
substantive significance. Hence, with non-equated scores (, ≠ 1 the difference between regression 
coefficients is meaningless.  
Standardized scores 
The most common strategy adopted in the existing literature to overcome the difficulties in comparing 
test scores measured on different scales is to standardize scores and compare average z-scores of 
individuals of different backgrounds as children age (e.g. Fryer and Levitt, 2004; Goodman et al., 
2009; Reardon, 2011;  Jerrim and Choi 2013). In a regression framework, this amounts to comparing 
x-coefficients from regressions on standardized scores. Results may be illustrated by simple graphs, 
and widening z-scores differentials across children’s characteristics are interpreted as evidence of 
increasing inequalities.3  
Indeed, differentials on standardized scores are invariant to the score metric. However, the sources 
of change remain unclear. The z-score differentials, obtained from (4) and (6), are: 
(9|
 + 1 − (9|
 = :
;
<=>?/ =
4
>?@/                                                                                               
(9|
 + 1 − (9|
 = AB4AC>?D                                                                                                 (7)     
Hence: 
6(9|
 + 1 − (9|
7 − 6(9|
 + 1 − (9|
7 = AB4AC>?D −
4
>?@/                                        (8) 
Clearly, unless E-D = E-/, expression (8) does not allow identifying any of the relevant structural 
parameters. Notice also that we may observe negative (8) even if no genuine mechanism making a 
group catching up its previous disadvantage is at play. Consider  = 0 and  = 0. Due to (1) and (6), 
expression (8) becomes: 
4
G4D>HDA>I/D A>IDD
− 4G4D>HDA>I/D < 0                                                                                                                    
Hence, in this case we observe a narrowing distance between children with different x simply because 
at t=2 there is higher variability.  
What substantive mechanisms may make the score variance increase? Once again, assume we are 
interested in social background inequalities. To keep the notation simple, scores are depicted as being 
                                                          
3
 Similar graphs based on average percentiles are shown in Cunha et al. (2006) to provide a simple illustration of widening 
socioeconomic achievement gaps.   
dependent on a single explanatory variable; however, other observed or unobserved factors may be 
involved. For example, gender, which, incidentally, is likely to be independent of social origin. 
Assume that for some reason gender inequalities widen between the two assessments, in the sense 
that at t=2 females will perform better on average than equally well performing boys at t=1. Although 
this mechanism should not affect the average social background growth differential in any way 
(neither directly nor indirectly, via previous performance), it will increase score variability at t=2, so 
that – in relative terms – high and low social background children eventually get closer. Therefore, 
even if in absolute terms the social origin scores differential does not change, it may decrease relative 
to the scores’ standard deviation.4  
It is important to notice that this is not necessarily a purely statistical artefact. On the contrary, it 
can be interpreted as a “real” effect, because the children of high and low social backgrounds do 
become more similar in some sense. Thus, if our aim is purely descriptive, comparing x-differentials 
of standardized scores at different occasions may make sense. However, the observed change could 
be due entirely to mechanisms that are totally unrelated with the grouping of interest: the use of 
standardized scores does not allow inferring the occurrence of any process making children with 
different x improving or worsening their performance relative to each other.  
Another point is worth noticing. Assume that strong new x-inequalities develop between t=1 and 
t=2, so that  is positive and large. This will drive up the numerator of (7), i.e. 1 + 	 + , but it 
will also drive up the denominator, because it contributes to increasing the scores’ variability. Since 
(7) is a growing but highly non-linear function of , strong new x-inequalities will not necessarily be 
reflected in a large value of (8).  
Summing up, the comparison of regression coefficients with cross-sectional data does not allow 
identifying any of the structural parameters of interest, neither using absolute scores, nor using 
standardized scores (Table 1). 5 
Table 1. Identifiable quantities with different data- and score-types 
DATA TYPE SCORES INDIV GROWTH  
OVERALL  + 	 “NEW”  CARRY-OVER 	 
Panel data Same scale YES YES YES YES 
Different scales  NO NO YES NO 
Cross-sectional data 
(comparison of 
regression coefficients) 
Same scale NO YES NO NO 
Different scale-absolute NO NO NO NO 
Different scale-standard. NO NO NO NO 
                                                          
4
 Expression (8) may be negative even if  > 0 and  > 0. However, a positive value of (8) implies a positive  (proof 
in Appendix A). 
5
 We do not consider here more sophisticated pseudo-panel estimation strategies based on imputed regression, that under 
some conditions allow to estimate  with cross-sectional data (De Simone, 2013, Contini and Grand, 2015). As shown in 
Contini and Grand (2015) these strategies may deliver meaningful results only with very large samples, and hence are not 
appropriate for international learning surveys.   
3. International assessments and the evaluation of early tracking 
In this section, we review the empirical strategies most frequently adopted in the literature to analyze 
the effects of system-level features on achievement inequalities and compare the alternative 
difference-in-difference strategies in terms of underlying assumptions and restrictions.  
By providing comparable measures of competencies across countries, international assessments 
are increasingly employed to analyze the effects of institutional features of educational systems (for 
an extensive review, see Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011). The most common modelling strategies 
are pooled-countries individual achievement models, with institutional features included as country-
level explanatory variables, or two-step models – where the parameter of interest is estimated 
separately for each country in the first step, and its relation with system-level features is analyzed in 
the second. These contributions focus on the effects of institutions on mean performance (e.g. 
Woessmann 2005, Fuchs ad Woessmann, 2007, Woessmann 2010) or on equality of opportunity, 
usually operationalized as the socio-economic background gradient (Woessmann 2010).  
The age of formal tracking into school-types offering substantially different educational programs 
varies greatly across countries: between age 10 in many German Laender to age 16 in UK and in 
Nordic European countries. Instead, the USA schooling system is comprehensive up to the end of 
secondary school, at age 18. To analyze the effect of the age of tracking on socioeconomic 
inequalities, Schuetz et al. (2008) and Brunello and Checchi (2007), examine single international 
assessments (TIMSS and IALSCC respectively) with a cross-sectional achievement model in which 
individual-level family background is interacted with a country-level dummy variable indexing early 
tracking. In essence, this amounts to comparing the family background coefficient between tracked 
and non-tracked countries. Interestingly, while Schuetz et al. (2008) find a substantive negative effect 
of tracking on children’s performance at grade eight, Brunello and Checchi (2007) find the opposite 
effect on adult’s cognitive skills. 
Difference-in-difference strategies 
The use of cross-sectional methods is open to criticism because they do not allow controlling for other 
cross-country institutional, cultural and societal differences affecting inequalities also before tracking 
takes place. To overcome this problem, in their seminal paper, Hanushek and Woessman (2007) 
analyze the variability of reading test scores (using the standard deviation and the distance between 
given percentiles) with a simple difference-in-difference strategy, exploiting two surveys held at 
different stages of the schooling career: PIRLS (4th grade) and PISA (age 15). The idea is that in 4th 
grade all children are in comprehensive school, whereas at age 15 in some countries students have 
already experienced educational tracking, in others they have not. Their empirical strategy basically 
compares the change in scores’ variability indexes occurring in this period, in countries with and 
without tracking. They find that in tracked systems variability increases over time relative to 
untracked ones, so they conclude that early tracking increases learning inequality.     
Drawing on the work of Hanushek and Woessman (2007), a number of scholars (Waldinger 
2007, Jakubowski 2010, Ammermuller, 2013; van de Werfhorst 2013) employ difference-in-
difference strategies by estimating similar pooled-countries individual models, to analyze the effect 
of early tracking on achievement inequalities related to social origin, using the TIMSS assessment 
for math, or PIRLS and PISA for reading. Interestingly, these papers get to conflicting conclusions. 
Similarly, in a recent paper Ruhose and Schwerdt (2015) use difference-in-difference to study the 
effect of early tracking on achievement inequalities related to migrant background.6  
We now examine these models more in detail. The simplest model is the one adopted by 
Waldinger (2007), Jakubowski (2010), Van de Werfhost (2013) and Ruhose, Schwerdt (2015): 
LMN = OPM + OQ + ξRMN + λRMNSM + ξRMNQ + λRMNQSM + MN                            (M1) 
where F is family background, I is the binary variable indexing early tracking, t is a binary variable 
indexing the secondary school survey, and subscripts i, c and t indicate the individual, country and 
survey. While the intercept is country-specific, all the other parameters are fixed, being allowed to 
vary only according to whether the system is tracked or untracked at age 15.7 Net of other individual 
characteristics and school explanatory variables (not mentioned here for simplicity), the family 
background coefficient at t=1 is ξ for untracked and ξ + λ for tracked countries, while at t=2 it 
is ξ + ξ  for untracked and ξ + λ + ξ + λ for tracked countries.  
The underlying assumptions of model M1 are very strong: (i) that family background inequalities 
at both surveys vary across countries only depending on tracking; (ii) that unobserved country 
characteristics may influence average scores, but do not affect family background inequalities.8  
A more flexible model is estimated by Ammermuller (2013): 
LMN = OPMN + ξTRMN + ξRMNQ + λRMNQSM + MN                                                     (M2)       
                                                          
6 Despite their limited number, some of these studies are often cited in the literature. The strategy and findings of previous 
versions of Ammermueller (2013) and Waldinger (2007) are described in the influential Handbook of the Economics of 
Education (2011) in the chapters: Hanushek and Woessmann “The economics of international differences in educational 
achievement” (pg. 156), and Betts “The economics of tracking in education” (pg. 367). 
7
 Some versions of this model allow for correlation between the errors terms within country clusters.  
8
 Additional restrictions, involving also M2, are that the error term has the same variance across countries and that the 
coefficients of all other control variables, for example age of the child or gender, are fixed across surveys and countries. 
However, as shown by Guiso et al. (2008), gender inequalities greatly differ across countries. Limitations of pooled data 
models and their comparison with two-step estimation when individual variables vary across countries in cross-sectional 
studies are discussed in Heisig et al. (2015).  
Here the intercept freely varies across countries and over time. Moreover, and this is the main point, 
the family background coefficient in primary school ξc is unconstrained, while its variation between 
t=1 and t=2 depends only on tracking (the variation is ξ for untracked countries and ξ + λ2 for 
tracked countries). Hence, the coefficients at t=2 are ξT + ξ for untracked and ξT + ξ + λ 
for tracked countries.9 The underlying assumptions are weaker than in model M1, because unobserved 
country characteristics are allowed to affect family background inequalities at t=1; instead, the change 
in family background inequalities between t=1 and t=2 is allowed to vary across countries only 
according to the tracking regime. Moreover, this change is fixed, and may not depend on inequalities 
at t=1.  
In both M1 and M2, the parameter of main interest is λ, representing the effect of tracking on 
family background inequalities. This is the so-called “difference-in-difference” (DID). For M1, DID 
is the difference between the coefficients at t=2 for tracked and untracked countries, minus the 
corresponding difference at t=1: 
λ = UVξ + λ + ξ + λW − Vξ + ξWX − UVξ + λW − ξ X                            
For M2, DID can be conceived as the difference in the regression coefficients at t=2 between tracked 
and untracked systems, given the regression coefficient at t=1 (i.e. at a given level of previous 
inequality):  
λ = VξT + ξ + λ2W − ξT + ξ.  
An even more flexible strategy would be applying difference-in-difference on social background 
inequalities with two-step modelling, similarly to what has been done by Hanushek and Woessman 
(2007) on test scores variability indexes. In a first step, country- and age-specific social background 
regression coefficients can be estimated with within-country models. In a second step, the estimated 
coefficients at t=2 can be related to early tracking controlling for inequality at t=1, by estimating a 
simple regression model or by graphical inspection. Despite this approach is deliberately exploratory, 
if within-country cross-sectional estimates are reliable estimates of the corresponding population 
parameters, in principle it could yield to valid causal inference. The critical assumption is that the 
change in social background inequalities between t=1 and t=2 only depends on tracking, or on 
unobserved country-level characteristics independent of tracking. Clearly, second step regression 
models run on a handful of countries suffer from small sample size. Yet, the same issue holds for 
pooled-country models on individual data, as the relevant sample size to the estimation of regression 
                                                          
9
 Ammermuller (2013) also analyses the effects of other institutional characteristics changing between primary and 
secondary school.    
coefficients of country-level explanatory variables is the number of countries (Wooldridge, 2010; 
Bryan and Jenkins, 2016).10   
Let us now give a closer look to the implications that each of the strategies discussed above have 
on the relationship between family background coefficients at t=1 and t=2. To the sake of generality, 
let us change notation and indicate these coefficients as Y and Y:  
(i) In model M1 (Figure 2, left panel) Y and Y are constrained to be the same across 
countries, given tracking regime and survey, and DID amounts to ∆Y − ∆Y, where ∆ 
refers to the difference between tracked and untracked regimes. 
(ii) In model M2 (Figure 2, central panel) Y (in the previous notation ξM is allowed to vary 
freely across countries, while Y (previously noted as ξM+ξ in untracked countries and 
ξM+ξ + λ2 in tracked countries) is constrained. Patently, the relation between these 
coefficients is: Y = Y + ξ + λ2S. In a Cartesian coordinate system, this yields to parallel 
lines, and parallel to the first quadrant bisector. 
(iii) In two-step modeling (Figure 2, right panel), there are no a priori constraints.   
As we will show in the next section, these differences will turn out to be very important, not only 
from the perspective of better identification of the “causal” effect of early tracking (to control for 
unobserved country-level factors), but also in terms of the meaningfulness of the delivered results. 
Figure 2. Difference-in-difference in pooled regression models and two-step analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
 
  NOTES.  Y = family background coefficient at t=1; Y = family background coefficient at t=2. 
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 For an extensive comparison of pooled-country models and two-step estimation in a cross-sectional environment see 
Bryan and Jenkins (2016, supplementary material) and Heisig (2015). 
ZSZ = ∆Y − ∆Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
ZSZ 
M1 M2 
Tracked 
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(Y) 
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4. Difference-in-difference with international scores 
Let us briefly review the main points made in the previous sections. In section 2 we have specified a 
simple achievement growth model and shown that, when scores are non-equated, the difference of 
cross-sectional regression coefficients based on absolute scores is generally meaningless and the 
difference based on standardized scores conveys limited information on the development of 
inequalities as children grow older. In section 3 we have reviewed the difference-in-difference 
strategies employed in the literature and highlighted that, in essence, the individual models on pooled 
data identify the effect of early tracking on family background inequalities by comparing regression 
coefficients across surveys. In this section, we analyze how the results derived in the previous sections 
specifically apply to test scores delivered by international learning assessments, and derive 
implications on the validity of the alternative difference-in-difference strategies employed in the 
literature to evaluate the effects of early tracking on family background inequalities.  
4.1 Test scores in international assessments  
We start with the following question: should we conceive international test scores as absolute or 
standardized measures of achievement? International surveys rely on Item Response Theory (IRT) to 
produce measures of achievement. These methods take into account the items’ difficulty, and in some 
cases the guessing probability and the items’ discriminatory power.11 Once IRT ability estimates are 
produced, they are standardized with respect to the mean and the SD of the pooled sample including 
all countries participating in the study. Transformed scores have mean 500 and SD 100.12 In this 
sense, PISA, PIRLS and TIMSS produce standardized scores. Yet, a fundamental difference with the 
notion of standardized scores employed above is that in section 3 we were considering scores 
standardized within countries. Instead, international assessments use the same yardstick for all 
countries: if we compare two French individuals in PISA, we observe how many SD they are apart 
with respect to the cross-country SD, not to the French SD. To our end, this feature makes 
international scores alike absolute rather than standardized scores.  
4.2 Difference-in-difference with original scores 
Let us think of PIRLS (4th grade) as the test at t=1 and PISA (age 15) as the test at t=2. As recalled 
above, international scores are standardized so to have overall mean 500 and average country SD 
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 In the IRT framework, the items’ difficulty and individual ability are measured on the same scale. The ability of an 
individual is defined as the difficulty of the item for which the probability that the individual will provide a correct answer 
is equal to 0.50. 
12
 Five random draws (the so-called “plausible values”) from the posterior distribution of ability given the item’s response 
pattern are taken for each individual. 
100.13 Measurement scales are non-equated. Thus, we may think of the original (equated) ability 
measures as being generated from models (1) and (6) – with [s substituting s. Roughly speaking, 
these ability measures are translated into international scores according to: N = \].^0]^E[Q__ ` 100 + 500, 
where E]^__ is the average cross-country SD of the original measure at t.  
Consistently with (4) and (6), for each country c international scores depend on the structural 
parameters 	, ,  introduced in section 2 according to:  
M = M + 	MR
M + M                                                                                                          (9) 
M = M + M + 1 + M	MR
M + M                                                                                      (10) 
with R = PP>c@/MM and R =
PP
>cDMM. 
Difference-in-difference with model M1  
In the most restrictive model M1, all the structural parameters of interest only depend on the tracking 
regime, so difference-in-difference (DID) amounts to: 
ZSZ = 6d + 1 + d	d −  d + 1 + d 	d 7R − 	d − 	d R                                      (11) 
where e denotes tracked and e untracked educational systems at age 15. The building blocks of DID 
are regression coefficients expressed in each assessments’ metrics, according to (9) and (10). Since 
R ≠ R, DID does not allow to identify any of the relevant mechanisms at play and this expression 
delivers meaningless results.  
Still, it is important to recall that researchers do not only have information on DID, but also on the 
single regression coefficients at the two surveys. Hence, we may ask whether this empirical evidence 
taken as a whole allows to infer something meaningful on the sign of the relevant parameters  and 
. The general answer is no. In Table 2 we show how the empirical evidence on regression coefficients 
relates to DID, and what are the implications on the structural parameters. In the first three rows, 
depicting situations where the genuine effects of family background are smaller or equal in tracking 
countries than in non-tracking countries at t=1, and larger or equal at t=2, DID is necessarily positive, 
and the implications are that either  or  (or both) must be larger in tracked than in untracked 
countries. In the last row, however, the family background coefficient is larger in tracked countries 
than in untracked countries, at both t=1 and t=2. Here DID could be either positive or negative. If 
DID is positive, once again either  or  (or both) must be larger in tracked than in untracked 
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 We disregard here that the set of countries may vary across surveys, and assume that they remain the same over the two 
assessments.  
countries. Instead, if DID is negative, nothing can be inferred.14 Hence, we conclude that the 
difference-in-difference strategy based on M1 conveys little useful information on the relation 
between institutional features and the development of inequalities as children age.  
Table 2. Empirical evidence and implications on structural parameters in model M1 
Observed regression 
coefficient at t=1 
Observed regression 
coefficient at t=2 
Observed  
DID 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
	d < 	d  d + 1 + d	d= d + 1 + d 	d  Necessarily positive d > d ∪ d > d) 
	d = 	d  d + 1 + d	d> d + 1 + d 	d  Necessarily positive d > d ∪ d > d) 
	d < 	d  d + 1 + d	d> d + 1 + d 	d  Necessarily positive d > d ∪ d > d) 
	d > 	d  d + 1 + d	d> d + 1 + d 	d  
Positive d > d ∪ d > d) 
Negative NONE 
 
Difference-in-difference with model M2  
In the less restrictive model M2, inequalities at t=1 are unconstrained, thus 	M may freely vary across 
countries, regardless of the tracking regime. As shown in Section 3, DID represents the difference in 
the family background regression coefficients between tracked and untracked countries at t=2, given 
the coefficient at t=1 (see also Figure 2):  
ZSZ = d + 1 + d	MR  − d + 1 + d 	MR  = d + d	M − d + d 	M R 
                                                                                                                                                     (12)                                        
In this case DID only depends on the score metric at t=2. This result is important because it implies 
that here DID is a meaningful quantity. A positive (negative) value of DID implies that the social 
background differential gap in achievement growth is larger (smaller) in tracked countries relative to 
untracked countries.  
Nevertheless, this specification has still some undesirable constraints. In section 3, we derived that 
for M2 the relation between regression coefficients at the two assessments is: Y = Y + ξ + λ2S. 
However, this constraint, implying a 45° degree line, is unnatural, and represents a threat to the 
validity of the results. To see this, recall the relation between regression coefficients and structural 
parameters: Y = 	MR, Y = d + 1 + d	MR in tracked countries and Y = d + 1 +
d 	MR in untracked countries. This implies that the general relation between Y and Y in each 
regime is linear and given by: 
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 The proof is trivial and not reported here. It is available from the author upon request. This result clearly applies in 
general when the regression coefficients differentials at t=1 and t=2 have the same sign and DID has the opposite sign.  
Y = dR + 1 + dR R⁄ Y                                                                                          (13) 
Y = d R + 1 + d R R⁄ Y                                                                                           
Clearly, 45° lines cannot describe these relations. Moreover, if d ≠ d  the two resulting lines will 
have different slopes. Notice that the lines would not be parallel even without scaling issues (i.e. even 
if  R = R).  
Difference-in-difference with two-step estimation strategy 
In step 1, cross-sectional regression coefficients are estimated separately for each country at both 
surveys. Hence, there are no restrictions on any of the coefficients imposed. In step 2 we inspect the 
relation between the estimated social background coefficient at t=2 and institutional features, given 
the estimated social background coefficient at t=1, using either simple regression models with 
countries as statistical units, or graphical inspection. Difference-in-difference amounts to describing 
this relation, as depicted in Figure 2 (right panel).15  
It is worthwhile noticing that, taking expressions (13) literally, the intercept gives information on 
new-inequalities , and the slope gives information on carry-over effects . Thus, it would be possible 
to draw comparative conclusions on the structural parameters between tracked and untracked 
countries. However, since the intercept in quite instable with small sample size and the linear 
specification is only an approximation, we prefer to use a heuristic approach, and limit ourselves to 
analyzing the relation in an exploratory perspective.16 
4.3 Difference-in-difference with within-country standardized scores 
In Section 3 we have argued that comparing x-differentials of standardized scores at different 
occasions gives a descriptive picture of how x-differentials evolve in a given country, even if it does 
not provide information on the sources of the observed change. In this perspective, we may consider 
difference-in-difference on within-countries standardized scores.  
Under the simplifying additional assumption that all model coefficients depend exclusively on the 
enforcing of tracking (so country SDs do not vary within a regime-type), standardized-DID for model 
M1 is equal to: 
ZSZhN = \CiAABi4ijD>?Di  −  
VCik AVABikW4ikWjD>?Dik ` − \
4ij/
>?/i −
4ikj/>?/ik`                                                  
                                                          
15 Jakubowski (2010), Van de Werfhorst (2013) and Ammermueller (2013) argue that since the sample of countries differs 
across international survey and waves, difference-in-difference should be evaluated on rescaled scores (in order to obtain 
the same mean and standard deviation within the set of countries under study). The results presented in this section show 
instead that this strategy is unnecessary and does not solve any of the problems at stake.     
16
 Since no countries display 0 inequality at t=1, the estimation of the intercept involves an extrapolation of the existing 
data; moreover, a small change in the slope’s estimate may affect the intercept substantially. 
The relevant parameters are clearly not identifiable. Yet, DIDst is not a meaningless quantity: by 
dividing by the country SD we obtain a metric-free measure, thus all its terms are comparable and in 
a purely descriptive perspective, some conclusions might still be drawn. Consider a positive DIDst. 
This result provides evidence that for some reason, the social background relative gap (relative to 
each country’s SD) has increased more (or decreased less) in tracked countries than in untracked 
countries. As previously discussed, there are various possible reasons underlying this empirical result: 
different “new” social background effects given previous ability between tracking regimes, different 
carryover effects of prior ability, but also effects of other explanatory variables (even if independent 
of social background, as for example gender) that may influence the within-country scores’ 
variability. In addition, since standardized regression coefficients may vary little even if  is large – 
because also E-D will increase – a substantial increase in inequality in tracked regimes will not 
necessarily be reflected in a large value of DIDst.  
 
5. Empirical analysis  
5.1 Data and methods 
We now carry out our own analysis on the effect of early tracking, exploiting the international surveys 
on reading literacy PIRLS 2006 and PISA 2012. PIRLS interviews children attending 4th grade (i.e. 
children at age 9-10), while PISA focuses on 15-year-old children. The time span between these 
surveys is approximately equal to the distance between age 9-10 and 15, so PIRLS 2006 and PISA 
2012 can be thought as independent samples of a single birth cohort over time. We consider only 
Western world countries, as they share more similar schooling systems, societal organization and 
cultures, in order to reduce the risk of unobserved country level confounding factors. We select only 
those countries participating in both assessments, ending up with 24 countries (see Table 3). By 
tracking, we refer to the formal sorting process into educational programs with different academic 
content and learning targets, while we do not consider other forms of differentiation such as within-
school ability-related streaming. We define countries as “tracked” if this sorting process on regular 
children takes place before age 15, as “untracked” otherwise. In our sample, we have 10 tracked and 
14 untracked countries (Table 3).      
In the empirical analyses, we focus on native children. The reason is twofold. Firstly, because we 
wish to avoid introducing an additional source of heterogeneity across-countries, due to the different 
composition of the immigrant background population in terms of countries of origin, immigration 
waves, socioeconomic fabric, and to the linguistic distance between countries of origin and 
destination. Secondly, because the relationship between social background and immigrant 
background educational inequalities is weak. Countries with low social background inequalities, 
often display large immigrant background-specific penalties (i.e. controlling for social background, 
Borgna and Contini, 2014). In this light, analyzing only native children has the advantage of avoiding 
confounding effects of early tracking on social background inequalities due to the specific effects on 
the immigrant background population.    
Table 3. Countries in the empirical analysis by tracking regime 
TRACKED 
COUNTRIES  
AT AGE 15 
(N=10) 
 UNTRACKED 
COUNTRIES  
AT AGE 15 
(N=14) 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Germany 
Hungary 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Russian Fed. 
Slovakia 
 
 
Canada 
Denmark 
France 
Israel 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Poland  
Romania 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
USA 
 
In line with the methodological considerations developed in the previous sections, we apply two-
step analysis. In the first step, we carry out within-country analyses and estimate the social 
background regression coefficients for each country. As indicators of social background, we include 
the log-number of books and a binary variable indicating whether at least one parent has tertiary 
education. In addition, we include gender and age as controls (see Appendix B for detailed definition 
on individual-level variables). In the second step, we analyze the relationship between estimated 
social background regression coefficients at t=2 and the tracking regime, given the social background 
regression coefficient estimates at t=1. We also perform a similar analysis on country test score 
standard deviations, as done by Hanushek and Woessmann (2007). Since these two measures (social 
background regression coefficients and standard deviations) convey different information, relating 
the two pictures allows getting a deeper understanding of the role of early tracking on the development 
of inequalities.  
5.2 Empirical results 
5.2.1 Difference-in-difference with pooled individual regression models  
For illustrative purposes, at first we show the results of difference-in-difference estimation on pooled-
countries individual models M1 and M2, with the tracking regime as the variable of main interest and 
individual level characteristics as controls. In Table 4 we report the results on the coefficient of the 
interaction terms λ. In the second column we report the estimate of the corresponding coefficient 
for the log number of books, in the third the estimate of the corresponding coefficient for the variable 
indexing parental tertiary degree. In the last column, under the heading REG, we report the estimated 
linear combination of these two coefficients, allowing to highlight the effects of tracking on the 
differentials between children with tertiary educated parents and “many” books (500), and children 
with non-tertiary educated parents and “few” books (5) books, controlling for gender and age. 
Table 4. Difference-in-difference results of pooled-countries regression 
 
ln(n°books) 
(1) 
tertiary degree 
(2) 
REG 
[ln(500)*(1)+(2)]- ln(5)*(1) 
Model M1 -5.92** 0.84 -26.41* 
Model M2 4.70* 1.57 23.24* 
N individuals 240,271 
N countries 24 
NOTES *p-value<0.05, ** p-value<0.01, *** p-value<0.001 
 
The results of the two models go in the opposite direction. According to M1, early tracking has a 
beneficial effect on social background inequalities; according to M2, early tracking contributes to 
increasing them. These conflicting results are due to the unnecessary restrictions, particularly severe 
in case of model M1 that, as shown above, may even produce meaningless results.  
5.2.2 Two-step analysis: First step results  
In the first step, we analyze data by country and survey. We compute descriptive statistics, including 
the standard deviations at t=1 and t=2, and estimate cross-sectional individual regression models with 
scores as the dependent variable, and socio-demographic characteristics as explanatory variables. The 
full set of first step results is available in Appendix C. In the following paragraph, we report some 
interesting correlations on absolute measures of inequality and country rankings.  
Overall inequalities and social background inequalities 
At each stage of the educational career, the total variance of test scores in each country can be 
decomposed into a component explained by social background and an unexplained component. More 
specifically, under the usual OLS assumptions: E- = YEl + E5. Hence, overall inequality depends 
on the social-background-specific effect (Y, on the variability of social background in the population 
El, and on the influence of other factors independent of social background (E5). This simple 
relation clearly shows that overall achievement inequality and inequality between social backgrounds 
are distinct phenomena: their relation is positive, but need not to be strong.17 As shown in Table 5 
(columns 3-4), the cross-country correlation between SD and REG (as defined in Table 4) is 0.617 at 
t=1 and 0.659 at t=2. If we consider country rankings instead of absolute values, we obtain 0.667 at 
t=1 and 0.578 at t=2.  
Not surprisingly, countries displaying larger inequality in primary school also tend to display 
larger inequalities in secondary school (Table 5, columns 1-2). Correlations between social 
background differentials (REG) are stronger than between standard deviations, and substantially 
larger within tracked countries than within untracked countries. Interestingly, the correlation 
coefficient between ∆SD and ∆REG displayed in column 5 (where ∆ refers to the difference between 
t=2 and t=1) computed on rankings is 0.738, i.e. positive and quite large (we do not compute the 
correlation on original scores, because, as we have seen, ∆REG has no substantive meaning). This 
tells us that countries raising their relative position with respect to overall inequality also tend to raise 
their relative position with respect to social background inequality. 
Table 5. Cross-country correlations on absolute measures and rankings 
ABSOLUTE MEASURES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 SD1, SD2 REG1, REG2 SD1, REG1 SD2, REG2 ∆SD, ∆REG 
Tracked 0.699 0.816 0.741 0.764 - 
Untracked 0.500 0.477 0.591 0.607 - 
All 0.492 0.569 0.617 0.659 - 
RANKINGS 
 SD1, SD2 REG1, REG2 SD1, REG1 SD2, REG2 ∆SD, ∆REG 
Tracked 0.587 0.760 0.806 0.446 0.830 
Untracked 0.274 0.751 0.584 0.642 0.618 
All 0.323 0.688 0.667 0.578 0.738 
 
5.2.3 Second step results 
In the second step, we analyze country-level inequality measures by relating them to the tracking 
regime. Focusing on overall inequality, we find that on average the standard deviation at t=1 (PIRLS) 
is larger in untracked than in tracked countries, whereas the relation reverts at t=2 (PISA), where 
tracked countries display (slightly) larger values (Figure 6). The relation reverts also when looking at 
social background inequalities, as the average achievement gap between high and low strata (REG) 
is slightly larger in untracked countries at t=1, while at t=2 it becomes much larger in tracked 
countries. We obtain similar results if we look at country rankings. 
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 A related measure of inequality considered in PISA reports is the proportion of the variance of scores explained by 
social background, i.e. YEl E-m .  
Table 6. Country-level measures of inequality and rankings 
 Original scores Country rankings  
 SD1 SD2 REG1 REG2 SD1 SD2 REG1 REG2 
Tracked 64.4 
(9.1) 
95.1 
(8.7) 
82.7 
(20.8) 
134.1 
(24.7) 
10.1 
(7.4) 
13.8 
(6.3) 
12.3 
(7.9) 
15.6 
(6.8) 
Untracked 71.3 
(11.3) 
92.9 
(8.7) 
84.0 
(20.9) 
117.3 
(14.7) 
14.2 
(6.5) 
11.6 
(7.7) 
12.6 
(6.8) 
10.3 
(6.5) 
NOTES. SD in parenthesis. Rank: 1=smallest, N=largest 
 
We now describe the results of difference-in difference analyses. Following the results in section 
4, we estimate a simple regression model relating the country-level measures of inequality at t=2 to 
tracking, given inequality at t=1. As remarked above, the statistical units in this step are countries, 
thus the estimation suffers from small sample size (but the same issue holds for pooled country 
models on individual data, because the relevant sample size for country-level explanatory variables 
is the number of countries). Sample size obviously influences the standard errors of the estimates, 
which tend to be large; hence, the results may not be statistically significant. However, as remarked 
by Borgna and Contini (2014), this should not be too much of an issue, because the countries analyzed 
are the countries we are interested in, and cannot be considered as a random sample drawn from a 
larger population. In this sense, all the analyses should be viewed as intrinsically descriptive, in the 
sense that they provide direct information on the population of interest, and statistical inference issues 
are not involved. Despite this caveat, we still report the usual results on standard errors and statistical 
significance.         
In a first model, we force the two lines – relative to tracked and untracked systems – to be parallel; 
in the second, we add an interaction term allowing them to display different slopes. Results clearly 
indicate that early tracking is associated with an increase in inequalities (Table 7). Given inequality 
in primary school, the social background differential is on average 17.6 score units (0.176 standard 
deviations, according to the overall OECD distribution) higher in tracked than in untracked countries, 
whereas the standard deviation is on average 5.5 score units higher. Models with the interaction  term, 
although not statistically significant for the SD, show that the slopes are larger in tracked systems, 
meaning that a unit increase in inequality at t=1 is associated with a larger increase in inequality at 
t=2 in tracked than in untracked countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Second step results. Cross-country regression models 
INEQUALITY MEASURE (IM) 
 REG SD 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Constant 67.24*** 88.95*** 59.39*** 65.63*** 
Track 17.59**    -35.18 5.45 -13.35 
IM1 0.596*** 0.337* 0.471*** 0.383** 
Track* IM1       0.634**  0.283 
     N 24 24 24 24 
R2 0.504 0.597 0.334 0.359 
* p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01  
 
 
In Figures 3 and 4 we show the scatter diagrams depicting observed and predicted inequality 
measures in the two surveys. Firstly, these graphs show that in primary school both social background 
coefficients and standard deviations vary considerably across countries, but also within tracking 
regimes. Secondly, they allow us appreciating that at low levels of inequality in primary school there 
is little difference in (average) secondary school inequalities between countries with and without 
tracking, while at high levels of inequality in primary school, tracked systems become (on average) 
considerably more unequal. This pattern is more evident on the social background regression 
coefficient than on the standard deviation. A close inspection of Figure 3 also allows highlighting 
deviant cases (Russia among tracked systems and France among untracked systems) that could be the 
object of more in-depth qualitative analyses.       
Figure 3. Observed and predicted social background differentials at t=2 given t=1 
  
NOTE.  Observed values in left panel. Predicted values in right panel 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Observed and predicted test scores standard deviations at t=2 given t=1 
 
 
 
NOTE.  Observed values in left panel. Predicted values in right panel. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have carried out an in-depth discussion of difference-in-difference strategies 
exploiting international assessments administered to children of different age, to evaluate the effect 
on learning inequalities of institutional features varying over children’s educational lives. In the 
existing literature, difference-in-difference has been carried out with two-step estimation by 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2007), who have analyzed overall inequalities (captured by test score 
variability measures), while other scholars have analyzed achievement inequalities related to family 
background (captured by the family background regression coefficients) with pooled-country 
individual level models. We have shown that while two-step analysis always delivers interpretable 
findings, pooled-country individual level models suffer from the imposition of restrictions hampering 
the meaningfulness of the results. The reason for the inappropriateness of most pooled-country 
individual level models, not acknowledged in the literature, rests on the fact that the dependent 
variable, test scores, are measured on different scales over time. 
Our methodological discussion can be synthetized as follows. Firstly, starting from a stylized 
achievement growth model, we have derived the relation between the model’s structural parameters 
and the difference between the cross-sectional regression coefficients of a given explanatory variable 
at different age of the children. If test scores are not vertically equated, this difference is shown to be 
meaningless when computed on original test scores, while it conveys limited information when 
computed on within-country standardized scores. Secondly, we have demonstrated that individual 
level models based on pooled data from all countries impose strong restrictions on the family 
background cross-sectional regression coefficients and on their relation. In the version of the most 
commonly used in the literature, DID is simply the difference between the cross-sectional regression 
coefficients at the two surveys, but as we have shown, this quantity is essentially uninformative. 
Instead, difference-in-difference delivers interpretable results when performed with two-step 
estimation.  
In the empirical part of the paper, we employ two-step estimation to analyze the relation between 
social background inequalities or overall inequalities and the tracking regime. Our findings point to 
a substantial increase of the social background coefficient in tracked relative to untracked countries 
at age 15, given inequality in primary school. Moreover, the gap increases with inequality in primary 
school: while at low levels we observe a small average difference between countries with and without 
tracking in secondary school, at high levels the difference is much larger. Results on standard 
deviations go in the same direction, but are somewhat weaker. In sum, early tracking appears to 
increase inequality, in particular by widening social background differentials.  
A final remark on the limitations of our approach. As for all the empirical strategies exploiting 
cross-country variability in institutional features, the results are hardly interpretable in causal terms. 
The most important reason is that countries vary on a multitude of characteristics, so it is difficult to 
“hold other things constant”. In this perspective, we consider two-step modeling as a more suitable 
approach than pooled modeling also because it clearly conveys the idea that we should consider our 
analyses as – highly informative – exploratory analyses. Using pooled-country models does not help 
in any respect; on the contrary, the formalization may give the impression to the naïve reader that the 
analyses are more rigorous. As we have seen, this is simply not true. A second problem is that the 
number of countries involved is typically small. Whatever the strategy, pooled models or two-step 
analysis, the relevant sample size for the estimation of the effects of country-level explanatory 
variables is the number of countries. Thus, we cannot rule out that the observed patterns are originated 
by random sources not under control. Finally, we have disregarded issues related to sampling 
variability in the first step. In principle, this could represent a problem, because it introduces 
measurement error in inequality measures in the second step estimation. However, with relatively 
large samples (and simple first-step models) this issue is unlikely to have a substantial impact on the 
results (Heisig et al., 2015).18  
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 Second step models have been estimated also with procedures accounting for classical measurement error (an indication 
of the reliability is provided by the standard error of the estimates in the first step): the results on the effects of early 
tracking change very little.  
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Appendix A.  
Proof that a positive difference of regression coefficients with standardized score implies n>0 
Assume that (8) is positive: 
AB4AC
>?D −
:;<=>?/ > 0                                                                                                                                                (A.1) 
As a consequence: 
 > o>?D>?/

2 − 1 + p 	                                                                                                                              
where  >?D2>?/ =
>?D>?@/. 
From (1) and (6) we derive: 
E-/ = 	q[r
 + q[r 
E-D = 61 + 	 + 7q[r
 + 1 + q[r + q[r 
The ratio is: 
E-DE-/ =
61 + 	 + 7q[r
 + 1 + q[r + q[r	q[r
 + q[r  
= 1 + 	q[r
 + 1 + q[r	q[r
 + q[r +
621 + 	 + 7q[r

	q[r
 + q[r +
q[r	q[r
 + q[r 
= 1 +  + 621 + 	 + 7q[r
	q[r
 + q[r +
q[r	q[r
 + q[r 
Hence, for 	 > 0 and  > −1, we obtain E2 E-/⁄ > 1 + .  
In conclusion, since these conditions are always satisfied, (A.1) implies  > 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B.  
Table B.1 Variable definitions. 
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES DEFINITION 
POPULATION UNDER STUDY  
Natives Children with at least one parent born in the country 
SOCIAL BACKGROUND  
Books at home Ln(n° books at home) 
Children report the number of books at home, based on pictures depicting 
different numbers of shelves.   
Classification in PIRLS is 0-10; 11-25; 26-100; 101-200, >200. 
Classification in PISA is 0-10; 11-25; 26-100; 101-200, 201-500, >500. 
The last two classes in PISA have been aggregated, so the two classifications 
are now identical. We have considered the central value in each class (500 in 
the highest class). 
In practice we use the following values:  
Ln(5)=1.61; Ln(13)=2.56; Ln(63)=4.14; Ln(150)=5.01; Ln(500)=6.21. 
Parents with tertiary education At least one parents with tertiary education=1 
No parents with tertiary education=0 
CONTROL VARIABLES  
Age Country-specific quartiles’ dummy variables (1°- 4°). 
We consider age in classes to allow for non-linear effects. The effect of age on 
test scores is unlikely to be linear. On the one side, the literature reports 
consistent evidence that older children tend to perform better (for example, in 
systems where regular children enter first grade in a given calendar year, 
children born in January tend to perform better than children born in 
December). On the other side, older children might be weaker. In some 
countries, there is flexibility in the age of first entry at school, so immature 
children might enter later, In other countries, poor performing children may be 
forced to repeat the school year, so older children are likely to be children who 
have experienced a grade failure. 
Quartiles are country-specific. This is particularly relevant for PIRLS,  
as regular age and age variability of 4th grade children varies  
substantially across countries (see Table B.2). 
Gender Female=0, Male=1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.2 Age of native students in PIRLS (2006) and PISA (2012) 
Country PIRLS PISA 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Austria 10.31 0.423 15.81 0.292 
Belgium 9.96 0.438 15.84 0.287 
Bulgaria 10.87 0.478 15.80 0.280 
Canada 9.92 0.350 15.84 0.283 
Denmark 10.90 0.369 15.77 0.284 
France 9.99 0.485 15.86 0.285 
Germany 10.43 0.472 15.83 0.286 
Hungary 10.65 0.467 15.73 0.288 
Israel 10.07 0.356 15.69 0.284 
Italy 9.68 0.318 15.76 0.285 
Latvia 10.97 0.448 15.76 0.286 
Lithuania 10.71 0.390 15.81 0.279 
Luxembourg 11.34 0.514 15.82 0.291 
Netherlands 10.21 0.467 15.70 0.286 
New Zealand 10.03 0.329 15.76 0.286 
Norway 9.79 0.289 15.79 0.291 
Poland 9.89 0.302 15.71 0.279 
Romania 10.92 0.488 15.72 0.274 
Russian Federation 10.77 0.491 15.81 0.289 
Slovakia 10.37 0.486 15.82 0.283 
Slovenia 9.86 0.303 15.73 0.285 
Spain 9.88 0.406 15.87 0.287 
Sweden 10.85 0.315 15.73 0.278 
United States of America 10.08 0.504 15.82 0.287 
 
  
Appendix C. 
First-step results  
 
Table C.1 Scores standard deviation and standard error 
Country SD1 s.e SD2 s.e 
Austria 59.32 1.39 88.27 1.7 
Belgium 54.42 0.89 95.7 1.78 
Bulgaria 80.95 2.25 115.8 2.73 
Canada 67.79 0.83 88.71 1.01 
Denmark 68.22 1.28 81.56 1.75 
France 65.65 1.01 103.98 2.33 
Germany 59.73 1.23 87.86 1.78 
Hungary 69.71 1.87 91.13 1.92 
Israel 96.44 2.56 112.28 2.4 
Italy 66.86 1.44 93.28 0.95 
Latvia 61.78 1.45 84.73 1.83 
Lithuania 56.30 1.26 85.60 1.5 
Luxembourg 59.46 0.92 96.63 1.51 
Netherlands 51.25 1.14 89.55 2.44 
New Zealand 85.68 1.54 101.79 1.89 
Norway 63.29 1.27 96.18 1.84 
Poland 74.59 1.31 86.87 1.6 
Romania 87.66 2.66 89.70 1.97 
Russian Federation 68.27 2.15 89.68 1.57 
Slovak Republic 73.32 2.19 103.35 3.16 
Slovenia 69.44 0.98 90.37 0.9 
Spain 67.77 1.3 89.22 1.13 
Sweden 61.37 1.38 99.88 2.09 
United States of America 71.78 1.43 90.22 1.76 
NOTES. Native students. Explanatory variables: Gender (0=F, 1=M); Age in quartiles (ref cat=lowest quartile); ln(n° 
books); parent with tertiary education. Regressions estimates with own R routines (intsvy package) for plausible values 
and complex sampling, using student replicate weights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.2 First step results. PIRLS (2006) 
COUNTRY const. gender age_II age_III age_IV ln(n°books) tertiary R2 
Austria 504.41 -6.88 1.25 7.63 -14.49 10.85 29.54 12.88 
se 6.38 2.69 3.29 3 4.33 1.32 2.72 1.57 
Belgium 515.73 -6.08 -1.35 4.75 -20.73 8.13 25.24 14.45 
se 5.06 2.48 2.71 2.97 3.22 0.94 2.19 1.48 
Bulgaria 507.98 -17.52 -2.31 4.92 1.16 11.51 39.25 15.65 
se 8.56 3.23 4.18 4.85 4.87 1.63 5.51 2.4 
Canada 502.74 -10.85 6.7 11.49 -2.12 11 24.78 10.82 
se 4.23 2.32 2.64 2.93 2.68 0.85 2.51 1.05 
Denmark 500.71 -14.03 4.98 3.94 -5.28 11.08 19.39 8.78 
se 7.26 3.38 4.1 4.82 5.19 1.21 3.82 1.49 
France 482.73 -7.91 4.24 8.42 -25.84 10.51 32.84 18.9 
se 5.24 2.96 3.4 3.14 3.96 1.09 3.03 1.51 
Germany 502.74 -10.85 6.7 11.49 -2.12 11 24.78 10.82 
se 4.23 2.32 2.64 2.93 2.68 0.85 2.51 1.05 
Hungary 484.04 -2.47 2.86 6.61 -16.37 15.62 37.85 23.09 
se 7.18 2.16 3.12 3.64 3.97 1.3 3.59 1.89 
Israel 488.91 -13.03 15.51 15.33 23.19 6.01 57.06 14.43 
se 11.07 5.2 5.97 6.47 7.1 2.41 4.69 2.22 
Italy 513.62 -5.19 8.07 15.18 19.58 7.82 30.87 8.51 
se 6.18 2.94 4 3.01 4.4 1.19 4.01 1.27 
Latvia 511.49 -22.15 -3.87 0.2 -11.85 10.09 23.19 12.41 
se 7.72 2.94 4.18 4.03 4.19 1.51 3.43 1.91 
Luxembourg 519.59 -2.02 6.77 5.7 -36.91 12.52 15.29 18.27 
se 5.23 2.31 2.6 3.02 3.76 0.92 2.9 1.62 
Netherlands 526.37 -7.89 0.24 2.23 -19.76 7.29 21.62 14.54 
se 5.31 2.11 3.16 2.72 3.78 1.26 3.19 1.95 
New Zealand 466.74 -18.12 6.59 15.7 12.19 17.6 27.39 13.5 
se 8.28 3.47 4.43 5.77 4.9 1.57 4.03 1.52 
Norway 449.2 -16.5 4.4 10.89 14.53 10.27 26.05 13.49 
se 6.56 3.31 3.68 4.08 4.98 1.3 3.46 1.74 
Poland 463.23 -14.35 9.6 11.31 11.9 13.23 41.6 15.3 
se 5 2.37 3.28 2.85 3.95 1.14 3.67 1.47 
Romania 439.18 -14.73 3.12 3.23 -17.96 20.41 42.53 18.7 
se 9.09 3.67 5.21 6.17 7.99 2.03 4.7 2.15 
Russia 505.31 -14.42 5.9 13.83 3.66 12.61 27.71 14.65 
se 8.64 2.9 3.51 3.35 3.8 1.53 3.66 1.84 
Slovakia 452.18 -10.09 7.13 8.68 -10.47 19.46 32.22 21.26 
se 7.07 2.39 3.13 3.41 4.97 1.6 2.9 2.21 
Slovenia 473.39 -17.66 3.77 6.84 9.26 11.84 40.79 15.97 
se 5.58 2.44 2.51 2.81 3.15 1.22 3.23 1.43 
Spain 476.38 -0.83 3.53 9.71 -6.73 10.12 29.28 12.52 
se 6.53 3.15 4.65 4.85 5.7 1.39 2.91 1.64 
Sweden 500.43 -16.19 8.7 11.07 10.39 11.08 24.11 12.35 
se 6.6 2.66 4.2 4.23 4.5 1.05 3.25 1.72 
USA 508.54 -8.64 5.96 4.97 -15.73 11.32 n.a. 7.28 
se 6.79 3.41 4 3.65 5.88 1.38 n.a. 1.29 
NOTES. Within-country regressions. Native students. Explanatory variables: Gender (0=F, 1=M); Age in quartiles (ref 
cat=lowest quartile); ln(n° books); parent with tertiary education. Regressions estimates with own R routines (intsvy 
package) for plausible values and complex sampling, using student replicate weights.  
 
Table C.3 First step results. PISA (2012) 
COUNTRY const. gender age_II age_III age_IV ln(n°books) Tertiary R2 
Austria 401.94 -30.09 3.49 6.41 5.41 24.02 19.96 22.92 
se 5.92 4.49 4.51 4.63 5.22 1.17 3.62 1.71 
Belgium 435.88 -28.42 7.44 13.66 16.01 20.68 19.80 16.94 
se 5.72 3.22 3.09 3.40 3.31 0.97 3.09 1.12 
Bulgaria 348.37 -59.75 0.74 0.87 4.13 30.72 33.09 32.06 
se 7.21 4.03 4.52 4.42 4.43 1.56 3.67 1.73 
Canada 438.98 -30.65 0.26 7.74 7.02 20.21 19.22 17.14 
se 4.31 2.05 2.94 2.88 2.85 0.80 2.03 0.93 
Denmark 434.17 -26.64 5.58 4.54 7.13 17.89 15.69 15.56 
se 5.71 2.63 3.89 3.67 3.59 0.98 3.54 1.34 
France 411.87 -36.89 0.82 10.41 13.23 28.53 11.60 24.29 
se 7.07 3.35 4.14 4.13 4.96 1.51 4.18 1.6 
Germany 422.13 -37.62 -1.76 7.52 10.89 24.15 17.65 24.69 
se 6.9 2.70 3.45 4.05 4.57 1.35 3.35 1.53 
Hungary 368.2 -34.52 6.68 9.28 12.7 27.97 17.90 30.56 
se 6.45 3.53 4.18 4.13 4.71 1.14 3.84 1.9 
Israel 418.29 -42.8 7.87 13.81 14.97 12.76 61.42 16.38 
se 10.53 6.82 5.71 6.27 5.57 2.07 5.2 1.54 
Italy 412.02 -34.1 -0.36 7.82 11.21 22.87 7.58 17.59 
se 4.12 2.17 2.10 1.92 2.38 0.71 1.96 0.73 
Latvia 431.1 -50.95 9.48 10.84 14.72 16.32 22.79 21.38 
se 6.30 4.15 3.94 4.29 4.49 1.19 3.66 1.69 
Luxembourg 378.69 -23.97 9.98 12.84 13.01 27.22 7.55 17.67 
se 7.66 2.98 4.88 4.17 5.53 1.43 3.89 1.52 
Netherlands 434.12 -22.58 1.7 5.45 9.44 22.69 4.51 18.23 
se 5.87 3.02 3.61 3.96 3.81 1.20 4.93 1.62 
New Zealand 405.21 -28.86 11.48 6.48 21.53 25.61 26.92 20.06 
se 9.23 5.01 4.30 4.56 4.78 1.60 4.1 1.78 
Norway 420.11 -37.57 5.16 14.83 11.41 22.69 4.48 16.65 
se 7.30 3.22 4.09 4.28 4.73 1.27 4.02 1.23 
Poland 449.34 -36.23 -1.25 6.54 4.75 18.78 33.51 21.47 
se 5.99 2.67 3.13 3.98 3.66 1.26 3.37 1.47 
Romania 375.75 -37.14 -5.31 2.13 -1.99 21.01 20.45 20.62 
se 6.49 3.48 3.49 3.46 3.55 1.36 3.83 1.88 
Russia 405.16 -35.09 5.38 8.54 5.96 16.11 39.32 18.3 
se 6.57 2.97 3.35 3.57 3.95 1.17 3.73 1.6 
Slovakia 343.4 -34.31 13.42 8.58 11.27 32.72 26.00 30.14 
se 10.61 4.10 5.44 6.03 4.81 2.00 4.37 1.98 
Slovenia 420.6 -47.44 -0.64 -0.74 8.11 20.44 29.66 23.83 
se 4.69 2.78 3.71 3.60 4.01 1.06 3.05 1.12 
Spain 393.83 -25.02 3.72 8.61 7.38 22.67 24.28 19.12 
se 5.03 2.18 2.6 2.49 2.63 0.89 2.31 1.07 
Sweden 397.59 -41.77 6.03 12.65 16.21 23.96 8.43 18.12 
se 8.13 3.93 4.53 3.90 4.45 1.46 3.32 1.31 
USA 424.35 -26.14 1.36 8.71 12.46 21.85 n.i. 16.70 
se 6.43 3.05 3.97 3.56 3.99 1.53 n.i. 1.79 
NOTES. Within-country regressions. Native students. Explanatory variables: Gender (0=F, 1=M); Age in quartiles (ref 
cat=lowest quartile); ln(n° books); parent with tertiary education. Regressions estimates with own R routines (intsvy 
package) for plausible values and complex sampling, using student replicate weights. 
 
Table C.4 Social background differentials and standard error 
 REG1 se REG2 se 
Austria 79.53 10.53 130.59 5.92 
Belgium 62.70 7.42 115.03 5.11 
Bulgaria 92.25 7.78 174.56 8.57 
Canada 75.44 6.20 112.28 4.08 
Denmark 70.40 8.97 98.07 5.73 
France 81.24 7.57 143.00 7.67 
Germany 79.76 8.51 128.87 6.27 
Hungary 109.77 2.33 146.72 6.75 
Israel 84.72 11.59 120.19 10.11 
Italy 66.87 6.05 112.92 3.71 
Latvia 69.66 7.14 97.95 6.28 
Lithuania 75.08 7.09 107.48 4.62 
Luxembourg 72.94 3.26 132.89 6.27 
Netherlands 55.17 3.10 109.00 6.86 
New Zealand` 108.43 7.80 144.85 8.42 
Norway 73.32 3.41 108.97 6.89 
Poland 102.53 10.12 119.99 6.61 
Romania 136.53 20.41 117.19 7.80 
Russian Federation` 85.76 5.63 113.50 7.10 
Slovak Republic 121.84 3.66 176.67 10.03 
Slovenia 95.30 4.28 123.77 4.60 
Spain 75.87 3.44 128.66 4.72 
Sweden 75.14 2.85 118.79 6.99 
United States of America 52.12 7.41 100.61 7.05 
NOTES. Under the heading REG we report test scores estimated differentials between children with tertiary educated 
parents and log n° books=6.21 (corresponding to 500 books), and children with non-tertiary educated parents and log n° 
books=1.61 (corresponding to 5 books), controlling for gender and age (see Tables E.2 and E.3). REG1 are estimates 
from PIRLS (2006). REG2 are estimates from PISA (2012). Standard errors of the linear combination obtained with 
own R routines (intsvy package) for plausible values and complex sampling, using student replicate weights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
